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lslomic Bonking: How Hos lt Diffused?.
Jibrin Muso*

l.
f

lnhoducllon

he oooer reoffirms thol countries with lorger finonciol systems tend, oll other things
I being equol, to grow foster becouse bonks generolly perform o fundomentol
I economic role os finonciol intermediories ond os focilitotors of etfeclive poyments
system (King ond Levine, 1993).ln evoluoting how lslomic bonking services diffused the
globol economy using country level doto for 1992 to 2@6, the poper identifies income

per copito, economic inlegroiion with Middle Eostern countries ond shore of Muslims
populotion os foctors influencing the development of lslomic bonking worldwide.
The centrolity of ribo (interest) in lslomic bonking, which prohibits Muslims from toking or

occepting interest wos soid lo limit the diffusion of lslomic bonking system. However, the
higher hurdles sel by the Shorioh low ensure the quolity of lslomic bonks. The shoring of
profit ond losses by lslomic bonks ond entrepreneurs mokes ihe bonks more prone to
finonce sound ond vioble projects, even if the entrepreneur hos no credit history.
ll. Hlghlights of lhe Poper

section one. the poperstotes thot lslomic bonks ore obviously becoming olternotive to
conventionol bonks in lslomic countries ond countries with lorge Muslim populotions like
Uniled Kingdom. ll shows thot ossets of lslomic bonks hove grown ot double digit rote
ond some conventionol bonks hove opened lslomic windows with Shorioh-compliont
finonciol ossets estimoted ot US$509 billion ot end-end-2007 (Moody's 2008). lt reveols
thot os much os holf of the sovings of the world's estimoted I .2 - l .5 billion Muslims would
ln

be in lslomic finonciol institutions by 2015. However, the outhors believe thot despite the
phenomenol growth of lslomic bonking in recent times, ils globol diffusion remoins poorly
understood.
Section 2 introduces lslomic bonking os o niche for Muslim bonking populoiion. lslomic
bonks ore soid to offer custodion ond other services found in troditionol bonking system.
The mojor difference identified wos ihot their services ore bosed on principles of Shorioh.
The outhors identified four distinguishing foctors of lslomic bonking to include:

'Written by Poftick lmom ond Kongni Kpodor ond Published os on IMF Wolking Poper, August 2010, WP/10/l95.
' J. Muso is on Assislont Director of lhe Monelory Policy Deporfmenf, Centrol Bonk of Nigerio, Abujo. Ihe views expressed in
ihis poper ore lhose of the outhors ond do not in ony woy represent the otficiol position of the Cenlrol Bonk of Nigerio.
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Prohibllion ol inlerest (Rlbo). lslom prohibits oll forms of ribo (interest poid
on loons) on the grounds thot interest rqtes ore exploitotive ond
inconsistenl with the noiion of foirness. lslom does not recognize time
volue of money. However, in cose of o leosing ogreement, time volue of
money is on integrol port of rent, os longer leoses ore expected lo yield
lt.

r.

IV

higherreturns.
Prohibllion of mqysir (gomes of chonce) ond ot ghoior (chonce). lslomic
bonking bons speculolion thqt increoses one's weolth by chonce roiher
thon productive efforts or toking excessive risk. This minimizes the
possibilities of conflicts between controcting porties.
Prohlbllion ol horom (illegol) octivltles. Only holol (legol) octivities ore

finonced. However, the poper notes thot il is becoming increosingly
difficult to find pure holol investments. ln thot regord, lslomic scholors
justify thot when o smoll shore (5.0 per cent) of o compony's business
deols wilh horom octivities. thot port of the dividend ihot is deemed
tointed should be donoted to chority.
Poymenl of pqd o, bonk proflls lo benefil society (Zokot). ll wos noted
lhot in countries where Zokot is not collected by the stote, lslomic bonks
esloblish o Zokot fund (2.5 per cent of ossets held) for collecting money to
be donoted to religious insfiiutions ond providing o minimum stondord of
living for the poor.

ln section three, the outhors reveol thot trodiiionol bonking sysiem four decodes ogo,
wos not ottuned 10 devout Muslim individuols who would not like lo put their money into

finonciol institutions thot were not bosed on religious principles, so, lslomic bonking
induslry emerged on o modest scole to fill the gop. ll identifies two cruciol foctors for the
feosibility of lslomic bonking. First, wos bottom-up experiments in Egyption villoges. which
grew inlo lorge indusiry in mony countries spreoding from Middle Eost to lndonesio,
Moloysio, sub-Sohoro Africo, ond Europe ond Americo. Second, top-down support from
creotion of lslomic Development Bonk of Jeddoh in 1975, which gove impetus to
diffusion of lslomic bonking. Other oreos of diffusion included the introduction of
products such os sukuks (lslomic bonds) ond estoblishment of lslomic Finonciol Services
Boord (IFSB) in 2002, with o mondoie lo sel prudenliol stondords for lslomic bonks. They
show the importonce of lslomic bonking vorying from being high in the Gulf ond Eost Asio
in obsolute numbers bul smoll in terms of investment finonce os shore of GDP compored
with conventionol bonks.
Section four specifies the diffusion of lslomic bonk to be o function of Muslims
populotion, interest roles. income per copito, Sepiember, I I ottock, petroleum
exporters ond economic integrotion with Middle Eost. Others included distonce from
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lslomic finonciol cenfers, finonciol syslem development ond mocroeconomic stobility

dependent vorioble
reveol thot income per copiio, shore of Muslim populotion, distonce to the two lslomic
finonciol centers (Bohroin ond Moloysio) ond existence of o developed bonking syslem
increosed the diffusion of lslomic bonking ocross countries. Besides, sound fiscol policy
wos soid to be vilol for finonciol development including lslomic bonking. However, the
outhors discover thot being o net oil exporter is not os importont qs people imogined.
Similody, os reol interest rotes rise ond poss o threshold estimoted ot 3.5 per cent, the
diffusion of lslomic bonking storis lo slow down. The results olso suggest thot less devout or
nonreligious consumers see troditionol ond lslomic bonks os substitutes becouse os they
put more money into lslomic bonks when opportunity costs foll ond move money into
conventionol bonks when the opportunity cost rises.
The regression results using number of lslomic bonks in o country os

The second regression results bosed on Tobit Model, which used the shore of lslomic

bonk ossets in totol bonking ossets os dependent vorioble, reveol thot income per
copito ond shore of Muslims in the populotion ore importont. The September I I' ottock
on US wos seen to hove o positive impoct on ossets of lslomic bonks os Muslims kept more
money ot home for feor of expropriotion. Rising oil prices olso increosed the diffusion of
lslomic bonks. Troding with Middle Eost countries hod impoct on ossets of lslomic bonks.
However. distonce to lslomic finonciol centers did not hove significont impoct on
diffusion of lslomic bonking os well os finoncioldevelopment in controst to eorlierfinding
using Poisson Model.
ln section five, the outhors conclude the

poperwith o remork thotwithin o few decodes

lslomic bonking moved from o niche morket into moinstreom. Generolly, they observe
thot the probobility of lslomic bonking to develop in o given country increoses with rises
in the shore of Muslim populotion, income per copito, ond whether the country is o net
exporter of oil. Troding with Middle Eost ond proximity to lslomic finonciol cenlers were
olso identified os cruciolfordiffusion of lslomic bonking.

lll.

Commenls
The poper hos evoluoted the development of lslomic bonking from o niche morket in
some iurisdictions to o well-recognized bonking proctice in the globol finonciol morkel.
This effort is highly commendoble. The role of lslomic bonks os finonciol intermediories
ond focilitotors of poyments system in developing countries with lorge number of
Muslims populotion wos highlighted. However, there is the need to exomine in more
detoils vorious lslomic bonking products ond show how lslomic Finonciol Services Boord
reloteswith othersimilor bodies like FinonciolService Authority of UK.
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subject of intense public
The lslomic (non-interest) bonking. which hos become o
ond could be o good
debote in Nigerio hos been cleorly discussed by the oulhors
on ihe groMh ond
reference moteriol for Nigerions who require more informoiion
From both print ond
development of lslomic (non-interest) bonking worldwide'
(non-interest bonking) os o
electronic medio, mony Nigerions perceive lslomic bonking
hos provided evidence for the
threot to other religious beliefs, but the oulhors' onolysis
phenomenon growth of the non inleresl bonking (lslomic bonking) in the countries with
lorge number of Muslims populotion globolly. They olso reveol ihot lslomic bonks hove
lorge number of non-Muslims os customers ond tried to remove the feor being expressed
bysome Nigerions on the developmentof regulotoryond supervisory f romework for noninterest (lslomic) bonking by the Cenlrol Bonk of Nigerio ond the estoblishmeni of the
proposed Joiz Bonk in Nigerio. lt is importont to note thot the word "lslomic" is not port of
the nome of the proposed non-inleresl (lslomic) bonk, Joiz Bonk in complionce with the
provisions of the Bonk ond Other Finonciol lnstitutions Act, I 999.
imperotive to nole lhot the CBN intervention in the non-interesl (lslomic) bonking
is not in form of officiol support like those of centrol bonk of Moloysio ond Bohroin os
reveoled by the poper bul os o finonciol regulotor thot is stotuforily required to puf in
ploce o legol ond regulotory fromework for lslomic (non-inlerest) bonks. Generolly, the
It is olso

CBN is required by low to regulote ond supervise bonking sector, including lslomic
bonking sub-sector, so os to protect consumers ond investors; ensure sound, sofe ond
stoble finonciol environment; ensure heollhy completion ond efficient service delivery
ond prevent bonking system foilure omong oihers. The non inlerest bonking fromework
issued by the CBn hos been mode flexible to

lV.

occommodote oiher religious beliefs.

Concludlng Remorks
ln conclusion, the poper oitempts to investigote the phenomenon growth of lslomic
(non-interest) bonking in countries with lorge number of Muslim populotion. lt shows thot
lslomic bonks ore concentroled in the Middle Eost, Norlh Africo, Southeost Asio, loter
spreoding to sub-Sohoro Africo, Centrol Asio ond western Europe. The outcomes of the
econometric investigotions identify the delerminonls of diffusion of lslomic bonking to
include Muslims populolion, interest rotes, income per copito ond September ll 2001
otlock. Others included economic integrolion with the Middle Eosl. dislonce from
lslomic centers, finonciol system development ond mocroeconomic stobility. lt is cleor
thot mosi of the foctors thot offect performonce of conventionol bonks such os income
per copito, September I I otlock, finonciol system development ond mocroeconomic
slobility olso influenced lslomic bonks globolly. However, September I I otlock offected
lslomic bonks positively.
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The poper noles thot lslomic bonks do not discriminote ogoinst non-Muslims in the oreos

of customers, investors or employment. However, il wos mode cleor thol Devout Muslims
see lslomic (non-inlerest) bonks os substitutes to conventionol bonks, while less devout
Muslims ond non-Muslim customers see them os complementory.

to investigole the diffusion of lslomic bonking in lhe globol
economy is highly educolive ond informotive. However, there is the need to exploin in

The etfort of the outhors

greoter deloils thot lslom hos encouroged o greoier relionce on equity ond profil-ondloss shoring by prohibiting interest. ll ploces emphosis on primory mode (rote of return not
determined in odvonce bul depend on outcome of business venture) of Mudoroboh
(possive portnership), or Mushorokoh (oclive portnership) ond shores of joint stock
componies (which ore o combinotion of both ihe Mudoroboh ond Shirkoh forms of
finoncing). lt hos olso ollowed certoin secondory modes (where return is fixed in
odvonce but the risk is shored) such os Muroboh (cosl plus service chorge), ljoroh wo
iqtino (hire purchose), Solom (forword delivery controct) ond lstisno (controctuol
production) to toke core of finonciol needs thot ore not omenoble to primory modes.
The primory ond the secondory modes together ore expected to intermediote
efficiently ond promptly between the surplus ond the deficit units ond thereby ensuring
finonciolneeds of counhieswith lorge Muslim populotion (Chopro, 1998).

foct thot opinions ore noturolly polemicol; bul lhe poper hos provided convincing
onolysis to show thot estoblishing lslomic (non-interest) bonks should not be perceived os
o ihreot of ony kind to ony notion but seen os o woy of ochieving finonciol inclusion ond
overoll finonciol sector development.
It is o

